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Abstract
We examine a model of contracting where parties interact repeatedly and can con-
tract at any point in time, but writing enforceable contracts is costly. A contract can
describe contingencies and actions at a more or less detailed level, and the cost of writing
a contract is proportional to the amount of detail. We consider both formal (externally
enforced) and informal (self-enforcing) contracts. The presence of writing costs has im-
portant implications both for the optimal structure of formal contracts, particularly the
tradeoﬀ between contingent and spot contracts, and for the interaction between formal
and informal contracting. Our model sheds light on these implications and generates a
rich set of predictions about the determinants of the optimal mode of contracting.
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1. Introduction
Contracting in a long-term relationship may come in a variety of modes. Contracts may be
formal (i.e. externally enforced), informal (i.e. self-enforcing), or a combination of the two.
Formal contracting in turn may be of the “spot” type, of the contingent type, or a mixture
of the two.1 Empirical examples of these diﬀerent contracting modes abound. The classic
paper by Macaulay (1962) and a number of subsequent studies have highlighted that formal
and informal contracting often coexist in long-term relationships, such as the ones between
firms and suppliers or between employers and employees (see for example Baker et al., 1994,
for a discussion of this literature). In the construction industry, where formal contracting is
intensively used, the relationship between contractors and subcontractors often exhibits a mix
of spot and contingent contracting. An important part of the contract concerns the project
specifications, and this part is replaced project by project (spot contracting). But there is
typically another part of the contract that applies to all projects, and in this part one can often
find contingent clauses, for example clauses that specify circumstances under which a party
can make changes to the project or terminate it.2 One can also find examples of long-term
relationships where contracts become gradually more contingent over time. Meihuizen and
Wiggins (2000) study supply contracts in the U.S. natural gas industry and find that many of
the observed contracts tend to become richer and to incorporate a growing number of contingent
clauses over time.
In this paper we present a repeated principal-agent model in which the contracting mode is
endogenously determined. A key feature of the model is that writing enforceable contracts is
costly. We argue that writing costs have strong implications for the optimal mode of contracting,
even if their magnitude is small. The model highlights that it may be optimal to use diﬀerent
1By spot contracting we mean that the contract is noncontingent but gets modified as circumstances change.
The diﬀerence between contingent and spot contracting is nicely explained by Williamson (1985, p.20), who
states that the writing of contracts “...can be done with a great deal of care, in which case a complex document is
drafted in which numerous contingencies are recognized, and appropriate adaptations by the parties are stipulated
and agreed to in advance. Or the document can be very incomplete, the gaps to be filled by the parties as the
contingencies arise. Rather, therefore, than contemplate all conceivable bridge crossings in advance, which is a
very ambitious undertaking, actual bridge-crossing choices are only addressed as events unfold.”
2See Eccles (1981) for an analysis of the contractor/subcontractor relationships in the U.S. construction
industry.
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contracting modes for diﬀerent aspects of the relationship, and yields rich predictions on the
impact of fundamental parameters on the optimal mode of contracting.
Next we give a more detailed preview of the model and of the main results.
We consider a multi-task, principal-agent setting with verifiable contingencies and actions,
where parties interact repeatedly and can write contracts at any point in time (this includes the
possibility of spot contracting, as contracts can be written after observing the state of nature
and before actions are taken). A contract can describe contingencies and actions at a more or
less detailed level, and the cost of writing a contract is increasing in the amount of detail. In
each period, parties can save on writing costs by modifying the previous contract rather than
drafting a whole new contract.
In the first part of the paper we focus on situations where the parties rely entirely on
formal contracting. A simple way to capture these situations is to consider the finite-horizon
version of the game, where there are no credible punishments to enforce obligations that are not
specified in the formal contracts. We examine the optimal structure of formal contracts, and
in particular the choice between contingent and spot contracts. At the intuitive level, it is not
obvious whether the presence of writing costs should favor contingent or spot contracting: on
the one hand, spot contracting avoids the cost of describing contingencies; on the other hand,
spot contracts must describe the agent’s behavior repeatedly, and this may push in favor of a
contingent contract. The idea that transaction costs might favor contingent contracting has
already been expressed informally, for example by Hart and Holmstrom (1987, p. 130), who
write: “if a relationship is repetitive, it may save on transaction costs to decide in advance what
actions each party should take rather than to negotiate a succession of short term contracts.”
Our model allows us to explore this tradeoﬀ more systematically.3
Absent writing costs, the model has no predictive power, because there is a plethora of
optimal contracting plans, including a contingent contract, a sequence of spot contracts, and a
host of intermediate solutions. But in the presence of (even very small) writing costs, the model
3In our model contingent contracting may be preferred to spot contracting because it is costly to describe
actions. Another type of transaction cost that can generate a preference for contingent contracts is given by
fixed recontracting costs. This point is made in the context of macroeconomic models by Gray (1976, 1978) and
Dye (1985b).
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yields a unique optimum. Each task is optimally handled in one of three ways: (i) a contingent
clause, written once and for all; (ii) a sequence of spot clauses; or (iii) a noncontingent clause
that is replaced at some point in time by a contingent clause (we refer to this as the "enrichment"
approach). A contingent approach is optimal when the cost of describing contingencies is low
relative to the cost of describing actions; a spot approach is optimal when this relative cost is
high; and an enrichment approach may be optimal when this relative cost takes intermediate
values.
If the enrichment approach is optimal for some of the tasks, the model predicts that the
number of contingent clauses in the contract will increase over time. This is consistent with
Meihuizen and Wiggins’s (2000) observation that contracts in the natural gas industry become
gradually more contingent over time. The interpretation of this phenomenon suggested by our
model is that it may be eﬃcient to introduce a new contingent clause in the contract when a
new event occurs that was previously considered unlikely.4
Two other important determinants of the optimal contracting mode are the degree of uncer-
tainty and the durability of the relationship. We find that tasks characterized by a higher degree
of uncertainty are more likely to be regulated by contingent clauses, whereas lower-uncertainty
tasks are more likely to be regulated by a spot approach. Similarly, the model predicts that
the prevalence of spot contracting relative to contingent contracting should be higher when the
external environment is more stable. On the other hand, we find that the relative prevalence
of spot contracting is lower when the relationship is more durable. Interestingly, then, the
stability of the relationship and the stability of the external environment have opposite eﬀects
on the choice between spot and contingent contracts.
Our model also oﬀers interesting insights regarding the interaction of formal and informal
contracting. As we mentioned at the outset, there is ample anecdotal evidence that these two
modes of contracting often go hand in hand. The presence of writing costs provides a theoretical
4One might argue that the new contingent clauses may have been added because the parties became aware or
previously unforeseen contingencies. But this cannot fully explain the increase in contingent clauses documented
by Meihuizen and Wiggins. Around 1975, most of the gas supply contracts were amended to include a new
clause that provided for renegotiation of the price in case of deregulation of the industry. Since the industry
was regulated, the contracting parties were almost by definition aware of the possibility of deregulation. We are
therefore inclined to think that this contingency was missing because it was considered very unlikely, and was
later introduced because its likelihood was revised upwards.
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explanation for the coexistence of formal and informal contracting. Intuitively, the advantage
of a self-enforcing contract is that it can be communicated informally, rather than being written
formally, and this saves on writing costs. On the other hand, if parties are not very patient,
they will not be able to govern all tasks by self-enforcing contract. Hence there is a trade-oﬀ
between formal and informal contracting.
Formally, we allow for the possibility of self-enforcing contracts by focusing on the infinite-
horizon version of the game. We find that formal and informal contracting tend to be used
jointly, with some tasks regulated formally and others regulated informally. In particular,
tasks characterized (other things equal) by a lower cost for the agent are regulated by informal
contracting, while higher-cost tasks are regulated by formal contracting. This is because the
agent has a stronger incentive to cheat for higher-cost tasks. The presence of writing costs
can thus contribute to explain the fact that long-term relationships are often managed by a
combination of formal and informal contracting.
Formal and informal contracts coexist provided that (i) the discount factor is not too high,
so that a fully informal contract cannot be sustained, and (ii) at least one task has a relatively
low cost, so that at least one task can be regulated informally. Interestingly, this is true even
if writing costs are very small. In fact, reducing writing costs may even facilitate informal
contracting, as we point out below.
When we examine the eﬀects of exogenous parameter changes, we find that the relative
importance of informal contracting tends to be higher when the potential surplus from the
relationship is larger, when the degree of uncertainty is lower, and when writing costs are lower.
This is a consequence of the fact that each of these parameter changes relaxes the incentive-
compatibility constraints, and hence makes informal contracting easier to sustain.
Earlier in this introduction we talked about the tradeoﬀ between spot and contingent con-
tracting when only formal contracting is available. This tradeoﬀ changes in an interesting way
when informal contracting is available. The key point is that with spot contracting, writing
costs must be incurred repeatedly over time, and this strains the incentive constraint, whereas
with a contingent contract all writing costs are incurred upfront, and this does not place any
burden on the incentive constraint. Thus contingent contracting has better incentive properties
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than spot contracting. We conclude that the relative importance of contingent versus spot
contracting should be higher in relationships where formal and informal contracting coexist, as
compared with situations where contracting is purely formal.
Most of our analysis focuses on the case in which writing costs are relatively small, and
more specifically, small enough that it is optimal to implement the first best outcome. In other
words, we focus on the case in which contracting is “complete.”5 The emphasis on this case is
useful for two reasons. First, all the main insights can be brought out with small writing costs,
and the exposition is considerably simpler than in the case of large writing costs. Second, this
helps to clarify that contractual incompleteness per se is not essential to our results. In the
final part of the paper we show how to extend the analysis to the case of large writing costs.
If writing costs are large, the main diﬀerence in results is that contracting may be incomplete.
Contractual incompleteness can take two forms: rigidity and discretion. Other things equal,
tasks characterized by low surplus are left to the agent’s discretion, intermediate-surplus tasks
are regulated by rigid rules, and high-surplus tasks are regulated in a first-best way (by formal
or informal contracting). This parallels a result derived in Battigalli and Maggi (2002), which
focuses on a static model of contracting with writing costs.6
The interaction between formal and informal contracts has been analyzed also by Baker et
al. (1994) and Pearce and Stacchetti (1998).7 These papers propose a diﬀerent explanation for
the combined use of the two types of contract. They consider a repeated principal-agent model
where formal contracts can be based only on verifiable signals of the agent’s action, whereas
informal contracts can be based on unverifiable signals. In these models it may be optimal to
combine a formal wage and an informal ‘bonus’. Our model, on the other hand, explains why
it may be eﬃcient to regulate some tasks formally and some others informally (in our model
there is no need for bonuses). Perhaps more importantly, the rationale for mixing formal and
informal contracting in our model is not the presence of verifiable and non-verifiable signals,
5By “complete” contracting we mean simply that the first-best outcome is implemented, so this may include
contingent formal, spot formal, and informal contracting.
6We should mention that there are other papers on complexity costs as a cause of contractual incompleteness
in a static setting, for example Dye (1985a), Anderlini and Felli (1994, 1999), MacLeod (2000), Krasa and
Williams (2001) and Al Najjar et al. (2002).
7There is also a vast literature on purely self-enforcing contracts. Bull (1987) and Mac Leod and Malcomson
(1989), and Levin (2003) are prominent examples of this literature.
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but the interaction between writing costs and self-enforcement constraints.
Our analysis also yields contrasting predictions on the interplay between formal and infor-
mal contracting. One key result in Baker et al. (1994) is that, if the imperfection in formal
contracting is suﬃciently small, informal contracts cannot be sustained. Therefore their model
predicts that, if the formal-contracting system becomes more eﬃcient, informal contracting
may be undermined as a consequence. According to our analysis, even if formal contracting is
close to perfect (i.e. if writing costs are close to zero), the optimum typically involves a mix of
formal and informal contracting or a fully informal contract. Thus, we suggest that informal
contracting need not disappear as the formal-contracting system becomes more eﬃcient.8
Finally, our model yields interesting predictions on the choice between spot and contingent
contracts. The models by Baker et al. (1994) and Pearce and Stacchetti (1998) are silent about
this issue because the nature of the contractual imperfection is diﬀerent. In these models the
imperfection is given by the noisiness of verifiable signals about the agent’s performance. This
imperfection is exogenous and is present in every period, while in our model the imperfection
(writing costs) is endogenous and need not be incurred in every period.
2. The contracting environment
We analyze a repeated multi-task principal-agent game where parties can contract in each
period. Payoﬀs depend on actions and external contingencies, which are both verifiable in
court but costly to describe in a written contract. Thus, the only contractual imperfection
is the presence of writing costs. We model payoﬀs and writing costs in a similar way as in
Battigalli and Maggi (2002). We start by describing the language used to write contracts.
Πe = {e1, e2, ..., eN} is a finite collection of primitive sentences, each of which describes an
elementary event concerning the external environment. For example, e1: “the passenger has a
moustache”, e2: “the passenger’s bag is red”.
Πa = {a1, a2, ..., aN} is a finite collection of primitive sentences describing elementary ac-
8In section 4 we will be more specific about the reasons for this divergence in results.
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tions (behavioral events), for example, a1 : “check the passenger’s passport”, a2 : “search the
passenger’s bag”.
With a slight abuse of terminology, we will use the notation ek (resp. ak) to indicate both
an elementary event (resp. action) and the primitive sentence that describes it. We assume
that this language is the (only) common-knowledge language for the parties and the courts.
This ensures that there are no problems of ambiguous interpretation of the contract.
A state is a complete description of the exogenous environment, represented by a valuation
function s : Πe → {0, 1}, where s(ek) = 1 means that primitive sentence ek is true at state s
and s(ek) = 0 means that primitive sentence ek is false at state s.9 In other words, s(ek) is a
dummy variable that takes value one if elementary event ek occurs and zero otherwise, and a
state is a realization of the vector of dummy variables (s(e1), s(e2), ....).
Similarly, a behavior is a complete description of all elementary actions, represented by
a valuation function b : Πa → {0, 1}, where b(ak) = 1 means that elementary action ak is
executed, and b(ak) = 0 that ak is not executed.
We assume a very simple payoﬀ structure. There is a one-to-one correspondence between
elementary actions and elementary events. The principal wants action ak to be performed if
and only if elementary event ek occurs. In our airport example, the principal wants the agent
to check the passenger’s passport if and only if the passenger has a moustache, and to search
his bag if and only if the bag is red.
Principal and agent are risk neutral. The principal gets an incremental benefit of πk from
“matching” s(ek) with b(ak), while he gets zero incremental benefit if there is a “mismatch”.
Formally, the principal’s per-period payoﬀ gross of writing costs is:
π(s, b,m) =
NX
k=1
πkIk(s, b)−m (2.1)
where m is the payment to the agent and Ik(s, b) = s(ek)b(ak) + (1 − s(ek))(1 − b(ak)) is a
dummy variable that takes value one if there is a match between event ek and action ak, and
zero if there is a mismatch.
9To simplify the exposition we describe the basic notation omitting time subscripts. We will introduce time
subscripts later in this section, when we describe the dynamic aspects of the game.
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The agent’s interests are always in conflict with the principal’s, in the sense that his preferred
actions are always opposite the principal’s preferred actions. Formally, the agent’s one-period
utility is:
U(s, b,m) = m−
NX
k=1
dkIk(s, b). (2.2)
We will often refer to the job of matching action k with event k as “task” k. The parameter
dk thus captures the agent’s disutility from performing task k. We let N ={1, ...,N} denote
the set of tasks and we use bold capital letters to denote subsets of tasks, as in K ⊆ N.10
The parties’ reservation payoﬀ is zero. Assuming 0 < dk < πk for all k, the parties’ joint
surplus (gross of writing costs) is maximized when the agent performs all tasks k ∈ N. We
will refer to this as the first best outcome. Payoﬀs are common knowledge to the contracting
parties, and the state and the parties’ behavior are verifiable in court. Thus, there are no issues
of moral hazard or adverse selection. We assume that preferences and realized payoﬀ levels are
not verifiable in court, and that the principal cannot “sell the activity” to the agent (i.e., the
agent cannot be made the recipient of the revenue π).11
Next we define a contract. A contract is a pair (g,m) where g = (gk)k∈N is a set of N
clauses and m is a transfer from the principal to the agent (wage). Each clause gk regulates
a task. Given our simple matching structure between actions and events, we can restrict our
attention to four types of clause: (i) a contingent clause, constraining the agent to do ak if and
only if ek occurs, Ck : [ak ↔ ek]; (ii) a noncontingent positive clause, constraining the agent
to do ak whatever happens, Rk : [ak]; (iii) a noncontingent negative clause, constraining the
agent to do not ak whatever happens, R¯k : [¬ak]; (iv) the empty clause, D (for discretion),
that imposes no constraint on the agent. For example, if N = 3, the set of clauses (R1, D,C3)
10We could consider more general payoﬀ structures where the interests of principal and agent may not always
be in conflict. For example, we could allow for the possibility that the agent incurs a cost dk if and only if he
takes action ak, and the principal gets a benefit πk if and only if the agent takes action ak when ek occurs.
With more general payoﬀs the notation would be more complicated but nothing substantial would change in
the results.
11If preferences were verifiable, the first-best outcome could trivially be achieved by a contract of the form
“The agent’s behavior must maximize the sum of the parties’ utilities.” On the other hand, if realized payoﬀ
levels were verifiable, the first-best outcome could be achieved by oﬀering the agent a transfer that increases
one-for-one with the principal’s realized payoﬀ level. And selling the activity to the agent would be equivalent
to specifying a contingent transfer as in the previous point.
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constrains the agent to do a1 whatever happens and to do a3 if and only if elementary event
e3 occurs, leaving the agent free with regard to task 2. Note that, since we include the empty
clause among the possible clauses, there is no loss of generality in assuming that the number of
clauses in the contract is N .12
The parties interact for T periods (where T may be infinite) and have common discount
factor δ ∈ (0, 1). The parameter δ can also be interpreted as capturing the stability of the
relationship.13 Within each period t, the timing is the following: the state of nature st is
observed; then the principal oﬀers a contract (gt,mt) to the agent, incurring the associated
writing costs; if the contract is accepted, the principal makes payment mt and then the agent
acts (being constrained by the contract).
We assume that elementary events are independent of each other, and that each elemen-
tary event is governed by a Markov process. Let the transition probabilities for event ek be
Pr[st(ek) = 1|st−1(ek) = 1] = pk and Pr[st(ek) = 0|st−1(ek) = 0] = qk. Without loss of
generality we define labels so that pk ≥ qk for all k. We assume that the process exhibits non-
negative persistence, that is, qk ≥ 1/2 for all k. Note that this allows for the case of i.i.d.process
(pk = qk = 12). Assuming nonnegative persistence simplifies the analysis without aﬀecting the
main qualitative results.14 Finally we assume that the initial state is s1(ek) = 1 for all k; the
extension to the more general case in which also the initial state is random is straightforward
but tedious.
If at time t the principal wants to oﬀer a diﬀerent contract than at time t − 1, he can
save on writing costs (whose exact nature will be specified below) by modifying the existing
contract rather than writing a whole new contract. To capture this idea, we assume that the
contract of period t is obtained by amending some of the clauses of the contract in period t−1,
which serves as a default. This means that it is understood that each contractual clause from
the previous period is still eﬀective in the current period proposal (and hence enforced if the
12We note that in this model there is nothing to gain from making wages contingent on the state or on the
agent’s behavior.
13The parameter δ can be interpreted as the composition of two parameters, δ = ρδ0, where ρ is the probability
that the game will continue and δ0 is the ‘true’ discount factor.
14We could consider a general stochastic matrix for each s(ek), but this would not add much to the qualitative
insights of the model.
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proposal is accepted) unless it is amended.
More formally, the set of eﬀective clauses at time t is given by:
gt = f(gt−1, gAt ) =
³
(gk,t−1)k∈N\KAt , (αk,t)k∈KAt
´
,
where αk,t ∈ {Ck, Rk, Rk, D} (αk,t 6= gk,t−1) is the amendment for task k and gAt = (αk,t)k∈KAt
is the set of amendments.
We can now describe the costs of writing contracts. Writing primitive sentences is costly.
We allow for a simple form of dynamic writing economies: writing a given primitive sentence
ξ ∈ Πa ∪ Πe for the first time is (weakly) more costly than writing it the subsequent times. If
c(ξ) denotes the cost of writing ξ for the first time, we assume that the cost of writing ξ each
subsequent time is r · c(ξ), where r ∈ (0, 1]. Specifying the wage and writing logical connectives
(such as ¬ or →) in the contract is costless.
In each period t the principal incurs the costs of modifying the previous contract, that is,
the writing costs of the amendments gAt .
15 These costs (which are history-dependent, due to
the recalling economies) can be derived using the assumptions above. Focusing on task k, there
are only a few relevant possibilities that we need to consider:
(i) Writing a contingent clause Ck at time t = 1 costs c(ak) + c(ek);
(ii) Writing a noncontingent clause (Rk or R¯k) at time t = 1 costs c(ak).
(iii) Replacing clause Rk with clause R¯k or viceversa costs r · c(ak), since this involves
recalling an already-described action.
(iv) Replacing a noncontingent clause (Rk or R¯k) with a contingent clause (Ck) costs r ·
c(ak) + c(ek), since this involves describing a new elementary event and recalling an already-
described action.
(v) The empty clause D of course involves no cost. Also, removing a clause (i.e. replacing
it with the empty clause D) is costless.16
15Note that writing a clause at t = 1 can be seen as a modification of the empty clause D, which is the default
clause at t = 0.
16Introducing a cost of removing clauses would make our notation heavier without changing our results.
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We emphasize that in each period the contract is written after the state is observed. Thus,
writing a contingent contract would not make sense if the parties interacted for just one period.
But with repeated interaction, as we will see shortly, a contingent contract may be eﬃcient.
A final note before we start with the analysis. In the literal interpretation of the game,
the parties sign a one-period contract in each period. However, we could equivalently assume
that contracts are open-ended, in the sense that the existing contract is automatically renewed
unless modified. Thus, since a contingent contract is never modified, we can interpret it as a
contract that is signed once and for all at t = 1.17
3. Formal contracting
In this section we focus on situations where parties rely entirely on formal contracting. A
simple way to capture these situations is to assume that T is finite, because in this case backward
induction implies that the agent “shirks” on any task that is not covered by the formal contract,
and hence informal contracting is ruled out.
To simplify computations we will consider the limit of the game as T approaches infinity.18
However, we note that the qualitative results of this section would be preserved for any game
with at least three periods, therefore they can be interpreted as applying also to relationships
that have a relatively short duration. The analysis of this section can also be interpreted as
applying to relationships where the horizon is infinite but the parties for some reason cannot
coordinate on more eﬃcient equilibria, where informal contracts are sustained by the threat of
reverting to a worse equilibrium.
Another reason for analyzing the finite-T game is that it allows us to focus sharply on the
tradeoﬀs between diﬀerent modes of formal contracting (e.g. spot vs. contingent contracting)
17Note that we do not consider the possibility of multiperiod contracts (the current contract constrains players
only for the current period), and the principal is not allowed to make payments in excess of the wage specified
in the formal contract. At the end of section 4 we will argue that both of these restrictions are without loss
of generality in this model. We will also argue that our results would not change if the payment m were made
after the agent acts.
18In our game the subgame perfect equilibrium of the finite-horizon game is generically unique, and if there
are more than one they are payoﬀ-equivalent. For this reason we speak of “the” equilibrium.
11
without the confounding eﬀects due to the interaction between formal and informal contracting.
In our model, the limit of the sequence of subgame perfect equilibria as T → ∞ is the
Markov perfect equilibrium of the infinite-horizon game. A Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE)
is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) where strategies depend only on the payoﬀ-relevant
state variable (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, Ch. 13). The payoﬀ-relevant state variable
has four components: the current state of the environment st, the set of clauses used in the
previous period, gt−1, the set of tasks Mat−1 for which the corresponding elementary action
(ak) has been described in the past, and the set of tasks Met−1 for which the corresponding
elementary event (ek) has been described in the past.19 We will denote the overall state variable
by Xt = (st, gt−1,Mat−1,Met−1). Notice that, since the agent’s current choice has no impact on
future states, Markov strategies do not depend on past actions of the agent. This implies that
in the MPE the agent minimizes his disutility in every period taking the ineﬃcient action for
every task not covered by the contract.
In the MPE, the wage mt is set at the minimum level that induces the agent to accept the
proposed contract. Since the determination of the wage is a trivial aspect of the analysis, we
will focus on the set of clauses. Solving for the MPE boils down to maximizing the expected
discounted value of the surplus net of writing costs.
To state the problem formally, define a formal contracting policy as a function of the form
Xt 7→ gAt = ψ(Xt). This function induces, for each (t, τ ,Xt) (t, τ ≥ 0), a random value for the
surplus net of writing costs at date t+ τ , which we denote σψt+τ |Xt. The problem can then be
stated as
∀Xt, ∀τ ≥ 0, max
ψ
E
" ∞X
τ=0
δτσψt+τ |Xt
#
(3.1)
The optimal contracting policy is the solution to problem (3.1).
Most of the interesting points can be brought out by considering strictly positive but rela-
tively small writing costs. We assume that writing costs are suﬃciently small that the optimal
contracting policy implements the first best outcome, or in other words, “complete” contracting
19Formally,Mat is defined as follows: M
a
0 = ∅ andMat =Mat−1∪{k : gk,t 6= D}, andMet is defined as follows:
Me0 = ∅ andMet =Met−1 ∪ {k : gk,t = Ck}. We will sometimes refer to these as the “memory sets”.
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is optimal. A simple suﬃcient condition for this is:
∀k, c(ek) + c(ak) < πk − dk (C)
Later in the paper we will discuss how results change when writing costs are large, so that
“incomplete” contracting may be optimal.
Given our assumptions, we can derive the optimal contracting policy by looking separately
at each task k. For this reason, to keep the exposition simple we will drop the task subscript k
for the remainder of this section. We will reintroduce it when we examine informal contracting,
as there will be nontrivial interactions among tasks.
It can be shown that there is no loss of generality in focusing on the following candidate
rules for a given task:
(i) At time t = 1 a C clause is written, and it is never modified. We will refer to this as a
contingent rule, and denote it C.
(ii) At time t = 1 a noncontingent clause R is written, and it is amended every time the
realization of st changes. We refer to this as a spot rule, and denote it S.
(iii) At t = 1 a clause R is written, and it is permanently replaced by a clause C the first
time st(e) = 0 occurs. We refer to this as an enrichment rule, and denote it E .
One can show that no other rule can be strictly optimal. If we dropped our assumption that
the Markov process exhibits persistence, other rules could be strictly optimal, but the essence
of the results would not change.20 The following result characterizes the optimal rule for a given
task.
Proposition 1. Let γ = c(e)c(a) . Then, under assumption (C) the optimal rule is C if γ is small,
S if γ is high and E if γ is intermediate. E is strictly optimal for some value of γ if and only if
p > q.
20Note that a rule as specified above does not completely determine a policy, because it specifies amendments
only for reacheable states. For example, the rule saying that clause C has to be written at time t = 1 and
kept thereafter does not specify what to do after C is removed. This partial description of the optimal policy
is suﬃcient for our purposes.
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Proof. Since all three rules (C, E , and S) implement the first best, we only need to compare
the PDV (present discounted value) of writing costs for each rule, denoted bc(·):
bc(C) = c(a) + c(e),
bc(E) = c(a) + [r · c(a) + c(e)] ∞X
t=2
δt−1 (p)t−2 (1− p) = c(a) + [r · c(a) + c(e)] δ(1− p)
1− δp ,
bc(S) = c(a) + r · c(a) ∞X
t=2
δt−1 Pr[st(e) 6= st−1(e)] = c(a) + r · c(a) δ(1− p)[1− δ(2q − 1)]
(1− δ)[1− δ(p+ q − 1)] .
It follows that (i) C is preferable to S iﬀ (if and only if) γ < γ∗C/S = rδ(1−p)[1−δ(2q−1)](1−δ)[1−δ(p+q−1)] ; (ii) E is
preferable to C iﬀ γ > γ∗C/E = rδ(1−p)1−δ ; (iii) E is preferable to S iﬀ γ < γ∗E/S = rδ(1−q)[1−δ(2p−1)](1−δ)[1−δ(p+q−1)] .
Note that γ∗C/E ≤ γ∗C/S ≤ γ∗E/S iﬀ p ≥ q, which holds by assumption. Thus, rule C is optimal iﬀ
γ ≤ γ∗C/E , rule S is optimal iﬀ γ ≥ γ∗E/S, and rule E is optimal iﬀ γ ∈ [γ∗C/E , γ∗E/S ]. E is strictly
optimal for some value of γ iﬀ γ∗C/E < γ∗E/S , which in turn holds iﬀ p > q. ¥
This proposition highlights a key tradeoﬀ involved in the choice of formal contracts. There
are three contracting modes that can be optimal for a given task. The first is to write a
contingent clause at the beginning of the relationship. This involves a higher upfront cost, but
it does not involve any subsequent costs. The second is to write a rigid clause andmodify it when
needed; this is the ”spot” mode, where the contract is adapted as the environment changes.
The advantage of this contracting mode is that there is no need to describe contingencies, but
only the agent’s actions; the disadvantage is that writing costs must be incurred repeatedly
over time. The third possibility (the “enrichment” rule) is one that does not fall squarely into
either category of spot or contingent contracting: the contract initially specifies a rigid clause
but this is replaced later on by a contingent clause.
The parameter γ captures the cost of describing contingencies relative to that of describing
actions. It is intuitive that, if γ is suﬃciently low, a pure contingent approach is optimal, and
if γ is suﬃciently high, a pure spot approach is optimal. As a consequence, the enrichment rule
E can be optimal only for intermediate values of γ. Proposition 1 also states that E can be
strictly optimal only if p > q. To understand this statement note that E is better than S only
if c(e) is smaller than the expected future costs of amending a rigid clause any time it is needed
(the cost of describing the appropriate action at t = 1 is the same under both approaches and
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hence cancels out). When p = q the two states s(e) = 0 and s(e) = 1 are symmetric and
hence the present value of future costs under rule S is independent of the current state. If this
present value is larger than c(e), then it must be optimal to use a contingent clause from the
first period, i.e. it is optimal to use rule C.
Notice that, absent writing costs, the model has little predictive power, because there is
a vast multiplicity of optimal contracting plans. Any contracting plan that implements the
first best is optimal. These include a complete long-term contingent contract, a sequence of
complete spot contracts, and a whole host of intermediate solutions. However, as the analysis
makes clear, an arbitrarily small writing cost is suﬃcient to pin down a unique optimum and
deliver strong predictions on the optimal structure of formal contracts.
An interesting implication of the model is that, if the enrichment rule E is optimal for a
nonempty subset of the tasks, the contract becomes gradually more complex over time, as
noncontingent clauses get replaced by contingent clauses. As we mentioned in the introduction,
this is consistent with a phenomenon that has been documented empirically by Meihuizen and
Wiggins (2000) for the case of supply contracts in the natural gas industry.
The model also generates interesting comparative-statics predictions on the impact of changes
in the contractual environment on the choice between spot and contingent contracting. The
relative importance of spot contracting can be captured by the fraction of tasks regulated by a
pure spot rule. Recall that, even though we dropped the task index k from the notation, tasks
may be heterogenous with respect to any of the relevant parameters, so the optimal contracting
plan may regulate diﬀerent tasks in diﬀerent ways.
First we examine the impact of a change in the degree of uncertainty in the environment.
A simple way to parametrize the degree of uncertainty in this model is to consider the case of
symmetric persistence, that is p = q. Then an increase in p decreases the degree of uncertainty
(recalling the restriction p ≥ 1/2).21 If the p parameter varies across tasks, one can increase
(weakly) all the pks. We find that an increase in uncertainty implies a decrease in the fraction
of tasks regulated by spot contracting. The intuition is simple: if uncertainty is higher, the
21There is also another way to increase uncertainty: one can simply decrease pk holding qk constant for each
k. Our result holds also in this case.
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external state is expected to fluctuate more over time, and this increases the expected cost of
using a spot approach, while the cost of a contingent rule is not aﬀected by uncertainty.
Another parameter that aﬀects the tradeoﬀ between contingent and spot contracting is the
discount factor δ. We find that the fraction of tasks regulated by spot contracting is decreasing
in δ. The intuitive reason is that a spot approach saves on the cost of describing external events
in the first period at the price of paying the cost of describing actions in future periods. The
following proposition, whose proof can be found in Appendix together with the proofs of all
remaining results, summarizes these comparative statics results:
Proposition 2. Under assumption (C):
(i) An increase in uncertainty leads to a decrease in the fraction of tasks regulated by spot
contracting.
(ii) The fraction of tasks regulated by spot contracting is decreasing in δ.
This proposition suggests an empirical implication of the model: spot contracting should be
relatively more prevalent when the external environment is more stable and when the relation-
ship is less durable. Thus the stability of the external environment and the internal stability of
the relationship have opposite eﬀects on the tradeoﬀ between spot and contingent contracting.
Finally it is worth highlighting a simple corollary of the above proposition: if uncertainty
varies across tasks, then tasks characterized by a higher degree of uncertainty are more likely to
be regulated by contingent clauses, while lower-uncertainty tasks are more likely to be regulated
by a spot approach.
3.1. Digression 1: the role of language
Next we argue that our language-based approach to writing costs plays an important role for
the predictions of the model. To make this point, we consider a more ‘traditional’ specification
of writing costs, similar in spirit to Dye (1985a).
Let {s1, ..., sM} be the set of states and {b1, ..., bM} the set of behaviors (where M = 2N),
and assign indices so that it is eﬃcient to do bj if and only if the state is sj , for all j. Now
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assume that, unlike our model, it is not possible to break down the description of a state or
behavior into its elementary constituents. Let cs be the cost of describing a state and cb the
cost of describing a behavior, and suppose that cs and cb are small, so that it is optimal to
implement the first best outcome. Keep all other assumptions of our model unchanged.
In this version of the model, ifN is not too small, a sequence of spot contracts is optimal, and
in particular it dominates a contingent contract. To see this, note that a complete contingent
contract must specify the eﬃcient behavior bj for each state sj and therefore its cost (paid once
and for all) is 2N(cs + cb); while a sequence of spot contracts costs at most cb in each period,
therefore its discounted cost does not exceed c
b
1−δ .
Thus, this alternative specification of writing costs implies that spot contracting is typically
optimal. This is in stark contrast with our model, where a contingent contract may well be
optimal even if N is large; indeed, with our specification of writing costs the optimal Markovian
policy is essentially independent of N (recall that the problem is separable in the N tasks).
For example, suppose N ≥ log2( 11−δ ). In this case, under the specification à la Dye, contingent
contracting is dominated for any cs and cb, whereas under our specification contingent contract-
ing is optimal for a whole region of parameters (in particular, if c(ak) < πk − dk and c(ek)r·c(ak) is
suﬃciently small for all k).
This should clarify our statement that the nature of language matters for the predictions
of the theory. The question of which type of language is more relevant is an open one, but we
have argued elsewhere (Battigalli and Maggi, 2002) that a language of the type considered in
this paper is likely to be more eﬃcient than a Dye-type language, and that it is closer to the
languages that we observe in reality.22
22Another remark about language is in order. We assumed that the language described at the outset is the
only common-knowledge language. In principle, the parties could construct a new language, for example by
attaching a new primitive sentence to each state and to each behavior, and write a contract with the new
language. Note that the parties would have to attach a vocabulary that translates the new language into the
original one, in order for the courts to be able to interpret the contract. If the relationship is one-shot, the
new language cannot be more eﬃcient than the original one, because the cost of writing the vocabulary in the
contract is at least as large as its benefits. In a repeated relationship, however, this approach might in principle
be eﬃcient. (We thank Leonardo Felli and Luca Anderlini for bringing this point to our attention.) A more
general model would allow for this kind of recoding of the language, but we conjecture that the main qualitative
results would not be aﬀected. We already allow for the possibility of “recalling” the description of an action a
at low cost; the eﬀect of coding would probably be very similar.
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3.2. Digression 2: the Maskin-Tirole argument
In a well-known 1999 paper, Maskin and Tirole have argued that unforeseen contingencies (or,
by a straightforward extension of their argument, the costs of describing contingencies) do
not imply ineﬃciencies in contracting, provided that an appropriate message-based mechanism
is played after contingencies are observed and before actions are taken. Here we argue that
the results of our model would not change if such mechanisms were available, and hence the
Maskin-Tirole irrelevance argument does not apply to our setting.
The key observation is that a message-based mechanism would oﬀer no advantage relative to
a spot contract. To see this, first recall an important aspect of our model that distinguishes it
from Maskin and Tirole’s model: here there are no ex-ante investment actions. For this reason,
in our model spot contracts are suﬃcient to induce the agent to take the eﬃcient actions. In
principle, a message-based mechanism might be useful if it allowed parties to avoid the costs
of describing the actions to be taken. But can this be the case? The answer is no. Even if a
message-based mechanism is played after contingencies are observed, the actions to be taken
must still be described formally, that is, in such a way that they can be enforced in court.
But if the formal description of actions is subject to the costs that we have assumed in this
paper, then a message-based mechanism can never be prefereable to a spot contract. It follows
immediately that these mechanisms are redundant in our setting.
4. Formal and informal contracting
In reality, long-term relationships are often governed by informal contracts, or by a combination
of formal and informal contracts. Informal contracts have an important advantage over formal
contracts, namely that they do not require a written description of actions and contingencies,
so they save on writing costs.23 The shortcoming of informal contracts, on the other hand, is
the absence of an external enforcement mechanism. Since an informal contract must be self-
23Arguably, the cost of writing an enforceable contract is higher than the cost of communicating an informal
agreement, because for the contract to be enforced by courts it must be written according to the commonly
accepted legal standards, which may be quite cumbersome to meet. In particular, it is not suﬃcient that the
language used in the formal contract be common knowledge to the contracting parties; it has to be common
knowledge to the parties and the courts, and this may require eﬀort and skills (or lawyers)
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enforcing, if players are not suﬃciently patient it may not be possible to implement the first
best outcome with a fully informal contract. In what follows we will examine more closely this
trade-oﬀ between formal and informal contracting.
Consider the game of section 2. The way we allow for informal contracts is by focusing on
the constrained Pareto-eﬃcient SPE of the infinite-horizon game. In such equilibria cooperation
may be sustained by formal rules and/or by informal rules: formal rules are enforced by external
courts, while informal rules are enforced by the threat of reverting to an equilibrium that is
worse for the deviator. The assumption that players focus on a constrained Pareto-eﬃcient
SPE is standard in the literature on self-enforcing contracts. This assumption seems reasonable
for situations in which there is suﬃcient mutual understanding between players, so that they
are able to coordinate on a “good” equilibrium.
Our objective is to understand under what conditions it is eﬃcient to govern the relationship
by formal contracting, by informal contracting, or by a combination of the two, and in the latter
case, which tasks are regulated formally and which are regulated informally. Finally, we will
explore how some key parameters aﬀect the optimal mix of formal and informal contracting.
The first step in the analysis of eﬃcient SPE is to characterize the optimal punishment
strategies. In this type of game it is eﬃcient to punish a deviator with his maxmin payoﬀ,
if this punishment is credible. We now show that, if players are suﬃciently patient, maxmin
punishments are indeed credible. We already know that the MPE keeps the agent at his
maxmin. The following lemma identifies a critical level of δ (which is close to 1
2
when writing
costs are small) above which there exists also a credible punishment strategy that keeps the
principal at his maxmin.
Lemma 1. There exists δ∗ (function of other parameters) such that for δ ≥ δ∗ there is a
SPE that keeps the continuation payoﬀ of the principal at his maxmin (zero) in every subgame
starting with a move by the principal. The critical level δ∗ approaches 1
2
as writing costs become
negligible.
To convey the basic intuition we focus on the case in which writing costs are negligible and
argue that the principal can be kept at her maxmin provided δ is slightly above 1
2
. Consider
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a punishment strategy with the following structure: after a deviation, the informal contract
is abandoned and parties revert to the optimal formal contracting plan (the MPE), with the
surplus going entirely to the player that has not deviated. If the principal oﬀers a formal contract
that she is not supposed to oﬀer, the agent is supposed to reject it unless it gives him the full
current net surplus. The key incentive-compatibility condition that this punishment strategy
has to satisfy concerns a situation where the principal is being punished. In this situation, the
principal has the option of tempting the agent with a “sweet deal” that gives the agent part
of the current net surplus. According to the candidate equilibrium strategies, by accepting
this oﬀer the agent would lose all the future net surpluses. Neglecting writing costs, a suﬃcient
condition under which the agent will not accept this oﬀer is
P
k∈N(πk−dk)< δ1−δ
P
k∈N(πk−dk).
The left hand side of this inequality is an upper bound to the benefit of accepting a “sweet
deal”. The right hand side is the present value of future surpluses, which is the opportunity
cost of accepting (assuming that the candidate equilibrium strategies are followed from the next
period). If δ > 1
2
this condition is satisfied, and the proposed punishment strategy is credible.
We note that the condition δ ≥ δ∗ is essential for Lemma 1. Consider the extreme case of δ
equal to zero: then there is a unique SPE (the Markovian equilibrium) in which the principal
oﬀers a formal contract and makes a positive profit in every period. However we suspect this
condition is not essential for our qualitative results. If it is not satisfied, it may not be possible to
keep the principal at his maxmin payoﬀ in the punishment phase, in which case the principal’s
incentive constraints will be more stringent, and this is likely to result in fewer tasks being
regulated informally, but our qualitative results are still likely to hold.
Having discussed the oﬀ-equilibrium-path strategies, we can now focus on the equilibrium
path. We continue to assume that writing costs are small, in the sense that condition (C) holds.
Under this condition, it can be shown that an eﬃcient equilibrium must implement the first
best, just as in the formal-contracting analysis. It is then natural to focus on simple equilibrium
paths where (i) each task k is either regulated by one of the first-best formal rules described
in the previous section (Ck, or Ek or Sk), or by an informal contingent rule prescribing the
first-best action, and (ii) the agent always accepts the proposed formal contract (gt,mt) and
takes the first-best action for each task regulated by an informal rule.24
24Recall that, given the assumed rules of the game, the principal must pay the exact wage specified in the
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Such an equilibrium path is described by a tuple (I,C,E,S,(mt)t≥1), where bold capital
letters denote subsets of tasks, and mt is a random variable, that is, mt : Ht → R, where is Ht
the set of histories of shocks ht = (s1, ..., st).25 (I,C,E,S) is an ordered partition of the set of
tasks N = {1, ..., N} specifying that tasks in subset I are agreed-upon informally and tasks in
C (respectively, E,S) are regulated formally via a contingent (respectively, an enrichment, or
spot) rule. We will refer to a tuple (I,C,E,S) as a task partition.
We say that a task partition is incentive compatible if it is part of a SPE. We say that a
task partition is eﬃcient if it is incentive compatible and there is no incentive compatible task
partition that yields a higher expected present value of the net surplus. Notice that in our
model this is equivalent to the standard definition of constrained Pareto-eﬃciency.26
Next we derive a necessary condition for the incentive compatibility of a task partition. If
some tasks are regulated by informal rules, the agent has the opportunity to shirk on those
tasks (i.e. increase his current utility by not taking the eﬃcient action). The most eﬀective
way to prevent the agent from shirking on the informal tasks is to give him all the net surplus
from the second period onward if he does not shirk and to keep him at his maxmin if he shirks.
Then the agent will not shirk only if the present value of future expected net surpluses is at
least as large as the current benefit from shirking. To express this condition formally, it is
convenient to introduce some more notation. Let π(K) =
P
k∈K πk, d(K) =
P
k∈K dk and
σ(K) = π(K)− d(K). Thus, σ(K) represent the surplus obtained by taking the eﬃcient action
for each task k ∈ K ⊆ N. Also, let bct(C,E,S|hτ) denote the expected present value of writing
costs from time t conditional on history hτ (τ ≤ t).27 Then it is clear that a task partition is
incentive compatible only if the following set of aggregate incentive constraints hold:
∀t ≥ 1, ∀ht ∈ Ht,
δ
1− δσ(N)− δbct+1(E,S|ht) ≥ d(I). (IC)
formal contract, mt. As we argue at the end of this section, in this model there is nothing to gain from paying
informal bonuses to the agent.
25It should be clear that, even if the wage is state-dependent, it is not written as a contingent wage in the
formal contract, but it is written period by period after observing the state st, so it involves no writing costs.
26The expected net surplus is simply the sum of the expected payoﬀs of principal and agent. Therefore,
constrained maximization of the PDV of expected net surplus implies constrained Pareto-eﬃciency. It is not
hard to show that also the converse holds.
27Note that, for t ≥ 2, bct(E,S|hτ ) depends only on E and S because the cost of contingent clauses is entirely
paid up front.
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The left hand side of (IC) is the expected present value of future net surpluses conditional
on history ht. The right hand side of (IC) is the agent’s disutility from performing the informal
tasks, which is also the benefit from shirking.28
If δ ≥ δ∗, so that maxmin punishments are credible, it can be shown that condition (IC) is
also suﬃcient for incentive compatibility. We then obtain the following:
Lemma 2. Suppose condition (C) holds, and δ ≥ δ∗ (where δ∗ is defined as in Lemma 1).
Then a task partition is eﬃcient if and only if it solves the following problem
min
I,C,E,S
bc(C,E,S) (P)
s.t. (IC)
where bc(C,E,S) denote the unconditional PDV of writing costs.
The solution to problem (P) in some cases may not be unique, for the following reason.
Since the set of task partitions is finite, a solution will typically not satisfy the (IC) constraint
as an equality. It may therefore happen that switching the rules of some tasks from formal
to informal and viceversa does not violate (IC) and has no impact on the objective function.
This is the case, for example, if tasks j and k have the same writing costs, and at a solution
of (P), j is regulated by informal rule and k by contingent rule. This example, however, holds
for nongeneric values of the cost parameters (the contingent clauses Cj and Ck must have the
same writing cost). Indeed, it can be shown that the solution to (P) is generically unique.29
From now on we take for granted that the assumptions of Lemma 2 hold and that the solution
to (P) is unique.
28Another way to interpret (IC) is the following. Suppose the principal pays a stochastic “eﬃciency wage”
mt(ht) which in expectation is just enough to keep the agent from shirking. Then the expected wage must be
m = d(N) + 1−δδ d(I). The principal would not renege on the promised wage after the first period if
σ(N)−mt+1(ht+1) + δ
σ(N)−m
1− δ − bct+1(E,S|ht+1) ≥ 0.
Taking the expectation conditional on ht and substituting the value of m we obtain (IC), which is therefore
a necessary condition for the inequality above. Setting mt+1(ht+1) = m − [bct+1(E,S|ht+1) − bct+1(E,S|ht)]
minimizes the strain on the binding constraint and makes (IC) fully equivalent to the inequality above.
29More precisely, it can be shown that the set of parameter vectors for which there are multiple solutions is
nowhere dense in the parameter space (i.e., its closure has empty interior).
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We first highlight some properties of the eﬃcient task partition with respect to the choice
between formal and informal contracting. Then we discuss how informal contracting aﬀects the
choice between spot and contingent contracting.
The next proposition states conditions under which the optimum is fully informal, or fully
formal, or a mix of formal and informal contracting. Let dmin ≡ mink dk .
Proposition 3. At the solution of problem (P):
(i) If d(N) ≤ δ
1−δσ(N), all tasks are regulated informally.
(ii) If dmin < δ
1−δσ(N) < d(N), and writing costs are suﬃciently small, some tasks are regulated
formally and some are regulated informally.
(iii) If dmin > δ
1−δσ(N), all tasks are regulated formally.
This result states that formal and informal contracting coexist if the total disutility incurred
by the agent over all tasks is relatively large (d(N) > δ
1−δσ(N)) and there is at least one task
characterized by a relatively low disutility (dmin < δ
1−δσ(N)). If the first condition is not
satisfied, then a fully informal contract is incentive compatible, and hence eﬃcient; if the
second condition is not satisfied, then introducing any of the tasks in the informal contract
violates (IC), therefore the optimum is fully formal.30
An interesting aspect of this result is that, as long as dmin is relatively low, the optimal
contracting plan is partly or fully informal, and this is true even if writing costs are very
small. This is in sharp contrast with a result obtained by Baker et al. (1994) who show
that if the imperfection in formal contracting is small, it is impossible to sustain any informal
contracting. This is not due to the diﬀerences between their contracting game and ours, but
rather to a restriction that they make on the punishment strategy: instead of focusing on
maximal punishments, they assume that deviations are punished by reversion to the static
Nash equilibrium of the contracting game. In our model, the analogous restriction would be to
assume that deviations are punished by reversion to the Markov perfect equilibrium. If writing
30The reason we need suﬃciently small costs at point (ii) is that if noncontingent formal rules are used, then
the present value of future writing costs enters the incentive constraint. See the proof of Proposition 3 in the
appendix.
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costs are suﬃciently small, this punishment strategy cannot deter deviations by the principal,
hence it cannot support any informal contracting.31
An interesting question is: which tasks are regulated formally and which are regulated
informally? Intuitively, informal contracting should be harder to sustain for tasks characterized
(other things equal) by higher disutility, because the agent has a stronger incentive to shirk on
these tasks. The next proposition confirms this intuition, under a ceteris paribus assumption
on other task characteristics:
Proposition 4. Suppose that writing costs and transition probabilities are the same for all
k ∈ N. Then, at the solution to (P), there exists a critical level d¯ such that tasks with dk < d¯
are regulated informally and tasks with dk > d¯ are regulated formally.
The basic argument behind this result is the following. Consider two tasks characterized
by diﬀerent disutilities, and suppose that one task must be regulated formally and the other
informally. Which one will be handled informally? The surplus is the same independently of
which task is chosen, but the low-dk task implies a lower incentive to cheat, hence it is better
to regulate this task informally.32
A natural question is how other task characteristics, and in particular the degree of uncer-
tainty and the benefit πk, aﬀect the choice between formal and informal contracting. Consider
first the role of uncertainty. Even if tasks diﬀer only in the degree of uncertainty, there is no
clear-cut result: comparing two tasks it is possible that the higher-uncertainty task is regu-
lated informally and the lower-uncertainty task is regulated formally, but also the viceversa
is possible. This is clear if one considers the case in which all formal clauses are contingent:
31To see this, note first that if some tasks are regulated informally, the principal must pay an eﬃciency wage
in order to motivate the agent to work (see footnote 28). This creates a temptation for the principal to renege
on the wage promised to the agent, and hence the principal has a strictly positive one-time gain from cheating.
Second, note that the MPE gives all the surplus to the principal, and if writing costs are small, this is close to
the maximum potential surplus. Thus the future loss from punishment for the principal, if any, is negligible,
and cannot outweigh his one-time gain from cheating.
32Recall that we are assuming that the solution to (P) is unique. While this holds generically in the un-
restricted parameter space, it need not hold generically in the subspace where writing costs and transition
probabilities are the same. However we can show that, if there is a continuum of tasks, the eﬃcient task
partition conforms to the proposition above.
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then uncertainty is irrelevant for the choice between formal and informal rules. Also the task-
specific benefit πk has no role in the optimal allocation of tasks between formal and informal
contracting: even if tasks diﬀer only with respect to πk, there is no way of saying which ones are
regulated formally and which ones are regulated informally. This is because the πk parameters
enter problem (P) only through their sum, π(N).33
Thus far we have examined the eﬃcient partition of tasks with respect to the choice between
formal and informal contracting. The model also oﬀers some insights as to how changes in the
parameters aﬀect this choice. The key observation is that any parameter change that relaxes
the incentive constraints makes informal contracting easier to sustain. Parameter changes that
have this eﬀect are (a) an increase in the total benefit π(N); (b) a decrease in uncertainty; (c)
a decrease in writing costs; and (d) an increase in the discount factor δ. The impact of π(N) is
apparent from inspection of (IC): other things equal, an increase in π(N) implies an increase in
σ(N), which relaxes the constraint. A decrease in uncertainty or in writing costs relaxes (IC)
because it reduces the present value of future writing costs, bct+1. Note that this eﬀect is present
only to the extent that some tasks are governed by spot or enrichment rule. An increase in δ
increases the PDV of future gross supluses more than it increases the the PDV of future writing
costs.
Any of these parameter changes increases the slack in (IC) for a given task partition. How-
ever, this does not necessarily mean that such changes increase the optimal number of informal
tasks, because the heterogeneity of tasks, the discrete nature of problem (P) and the inter-
action between spot and contingent contracting may cause oﬀsetting eﬀects.34 We can only
state broadly that these parameter changes tend to increase the relative importance of informal
contracting.
We can say something more precise when tasks are homogeneous with respect to writing
costs and transition probabilities (as assumed in Proposition 4) and formal rules are all of the
33As the next section makes clear, this is no longer true if writing costs are large.
34Consider the following example. There are three tasks, tasks 1 and 2 characterized by small disutility and
writing costs, task 3 by relatively high disutility and writing costs. Suppose that in the initial situation it is
possible to sustain informally task 1 and 2 but not task 3, because of this task’s high disutility. If a parameter
change relaxes (IC), it is possible that in the new situation it is incentive compatible to regulate informally task
3 alone, but not in conjunction with any other task. Then it is optimal to switch from regulating tasks 1 and 2
informally to regulating only task 3 informally.
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same type. Then parameter changes that increase the slack in the incentive constraints increase
(weakly) the number of informal tasks, and hence decrease (weakly) the number of formal tasks.
Remark 1. Suppose that writing costs and transition probabilities are the same for all tasks,
and consider any of the following parameter changes: (a) an increase in the total benefit π(N);
(b) a decrease in uncertainty; (c) a decrease in writing costs; and (d) an increase in the discount
factor δ. If at the solution of (P) all formal tasks are governed by rules of the same type (before
and after the change), then the optimal number of formal tasks (weakly) decreases.
The eﬀect of an increase in π(N) is very intuitive: this increases the gross potential surplus,
and thus increases the opportunity cost of deviations. Broadly speaking, this result suggests
that informal contracting should be used more intensively in long-term relationships where the
gains from contracting are larger.
As for the second result, an increase in uncertainty decreases the expected number of future
contract amendments, thus increases the net worth of the relationship in future periods, and
hence relaxes the incentive constraint. This in turn makes it informal contracting easier to
sustain. This same eﬀect explains the surprising result that a decrease in writing costs may
shift the balance in favor of informal contracting. The analysis of a change in the discount
factor is subtler: an increase in δ increases both the PDV of future gross surpluses and the
PDV of future writing costs, but it can be shown that the net eﬀect is to relax the incentive
constraint.
We now come back to the choice between contingent and spot contracting. In the previous
section we analyzed this choice when only formal contracting is available (i.e. at the MPE of the
game). Here we ask how this choice changes when informal contracting is available (i.e. at an
eﬃcient SPE of the game). Recall that the optimal formal contracting plan minimizes the PDV
of writing costs, whereas when informal contracting is available, the cost-minimization problem
allows for informal rules and is subject to the (IC) constraint. Intuitively, with a spot approach
writing costs must be incurred repeatedly over time, and this imposes a strain on the incentive
constraint; whereas with a contingent approach writing costs are incurred only at t = 1, and this
does not create incentive problems. Thus contingent contracting has better incentive properties
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than spot contracting. As a consequence, the presence of informal contracting should tend to
favor contingent contracting. The following remark confirms this intuition.
Remark 2. In the eﬃcient task partition it is possible that a task k is governed by contingent
rule even though a spot rule is less costly [cˆ(Sk) < cˆ(Ck)]. The reverse case is not possible.
This result suggests that the relative importance of contingent versus spot contracting should
be higher in relationships where formal and informal contracting coexist, compared with rela-
tionships that are governed exclusively by formal contracting.
A related question is how the presence of informal contracting aﬀects the results of the
previous section on the choice between spot and contingent contracting. The qualitative in-
sights about the partition of formal tasks for given parameter values are unchanged,35 but the
comparative statics results can change in interesting ways. The new eﬀect is that, when costly
contingent rules are used instead of cheaper spot rules to put less strain on the incentive con-
straint, a parameter change that relaxes the incentive constraint allows a more intensive use
of spot rules. This new eﬀect can generate surprising possibilities. In particular we note the
following:
Remark 3. An increase in π(N) or δ may increase the fraction of formal tasks governed by
spot rule.
Note that, when only formal contracting was available, increasing π(N) had no eﬀect on the
tradeoﬀ between spot and contingent contracting, and increasing δ shifted the balance in favor
of contingent contracts. The reason we only state a possibility result ("may") is again that
the heterogeneity of tasks and the discreteness of the problem may generate counterintuitive
results, but the tendency is clear: parameter changes that relax (IC) alleviate the incentive
problems associated with spot contracts, hence facilitate their use, whereas a relaxation of (IC)
does nothing to favor contingent contracting.
35For example, consider the role of uncertainty in the choice between spot and contingent contracting. It can
be shown that, if tasks diﬀer only by the degree of uncertainty, a set of low-uncertainty tasks will be regulated by
formal spot contracting, and a set of high-uncertainty tasks will be regulated by informal or contingent formal
contracting.
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Before concluding the section, we want to discuss our assumptions about timing, the possi-
bility to pay “bonuses” (i.e. payments in excess of what is specified by the agreed-upon formal
contract) and the possibility to write multi-period contracts.
According to the rules of the game, the principal pays the agent before he acts and the
payment is exactly the one specified by the oﬀered contract (if accepted). It is clear that each
of these assumptions is without loss of generality given the other. If bonuses are not allowed, it
does not matter when the paymentm occurs, because the principal has to paym independently
of whether the agent has shirked on the informally regulated tasks or not. On the other hand,
if any payment has to be made before the agent acts, bonuses are redundant, because the best
incentive to keep the agent from shirking is still to hold him down to his maxmin from period
t+ 1 if he shirks in period t. We now argue that even the joint assumption about timing and
bonunes is without loss of generality. Suppose that the principal is allowed to pay an informal
bonus immediately after the agent acts. In this case, the agent has a stronger incentive not
to shirk, because shirking will prevent him from enjoying an immediate reward. On the other
hand, with the modified assumption, the principal has an incentive to renege on the informally
promised bonus, whereas with our current assumption he can only omit to oﬀer the formal
contract specified by the equilibrium. It can be shown that these two eﬀects cancel out.
Similarly, it can be shown that there is no gain from writing formal multi-period contracts.
To gain intuition, suppose there is only one task. Even though committing to future wages in
the current contract would remove the principal’s incentive to renege on payments, this would
ruin the agent’s incentives: if future wages are assured, the agent will surely cheat if the task
is regulated informally. And if the task is regulated formally, then there is no gain relative to
one-period formal contracts.
5. Large writing costs
If writing costs are large, the main change in results is that it may not be optimal to implement
the first best for some (or all) of the tasks. In particular, two additional possibilities emerge: it
might be optimal to regulate a task by rigid rule, that is by writing a noncontingent Rk clause
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once and for all, or to leave a task to the agent’s discretion with no informal agreement to take
the eﬃcient action. Given our assumptions on payoﬀs, a rigid rule yields a gross incremental
surplus that is positive but lower than a first-best rule, and leaving a task discretionary yields
zero gross incremental surplus.
We interpret rigidity and discretion as two forms of contractual incompleteness, while we
think of a contract implementing the first-best outcome as a “complete” contract. If one adopts
this terminology, then the main implication of large writing costs is that they lead to contractual
incompleteness. Next we show how the analysis can be extended to this more general case.
We drop assumption (C). The only condition we assume on writing costs is that they are
non-prohibitive, in the sense that for every δ ∈ [0, 1) the optimal formal contracting policy
yields a strictly positive present value of the net surplus.36 A contracting plan can now be
represented by a (possibly) non exhaustive task partition (I,C,E,S,R) and a transfer process
(mt)t≥1, where R is the set of tasks regulated by rigid rules. The tasks that are not covered by
the partition are discretionary.
Let σˆt(R|hτ) denote the expected present value of future surpluses associated with the set
of rigid rules conditional on hτ (τ ≤ t), and let FB ≡ I ∪C ∪E ∪ S denote the set of tasks
regulated in a first best way. In this more general case the expected present value of future net
surpluses is δ
1−δσ(FB)+ δσˆt+1(R|ht)− δbct+1(E,S|ht). By the argument of the previous section,
a task partition is incentive compatible only if
∀t ≥ 1,∀ht ∈ Ht,
δ
1− δσ(FB) + δσˆt+1(R|ht)− δbct+1(E,S|ht) ≥ d(I). (IC’)
This is a generalization of the incentive constraints in the previous section. The only diﬀer-
ence is that now the surplus terms in the left hand side must be calculated taking into account
that the tasks regulated by rigid rules yield a stochastic stream of surpluses, and that discre-
tionary tasks yield no surplus at all. With relatively large writing costs, however, it is possible
36This is equivalent to the following simple condition: there is at least one task j such that c(aj) < πj − dj .
The condition is obviously suﬃcient, because it allows to obtain a postitive net surplus for task j by using clause
Rj or Rj , as appropriate, in every period. To see that the condition is necessary, suppose that c(ak) ≥ πk − dk
for all k and let δ = 0. Then introducing any (nonempty) clause in the contract would yield a (weakly) negative
net surplus in the first period that could not be compensated by positive surpluses in future periods.
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that (IC’) holds and yet the expected present value of net surpluses conditional on some history
of shocks ht is negative. In this case the task partition cannot be part of a subgame perfect
equilibrium. Therefore we have a separate necessary condition:
∀t ≥ 1, ∀ht ∈ Ht,
σ(FB)
1− δ + σˆt(R|ht)− bct(E,S|ht) ≥ 0. (PC’)
Relying on Lemma 1, we can show that (IC’) and (PC’) are also suﬃcient for incentive
compatibility if the discount factor is high enough. Therefore we obtain the following charac-
terization result:
Lemma 3. Suppose δ ≥ δ∗ (where δ∗ is as in Lemma 1). Then a task partition is eﬃcient if
and only if it solves the following problem
max
I,C,E,S,R
∙
1
1− δσ(FB) + σˆ1(R)− bc(C,E,S,R)
¸
(P’)
s.t. (IC’) and (PC’).
Note that the presence of large writing costs modifies not only the incentive constraints but
also the objective function of the problem: since it may not be optimal to implement the first
best outcome, we need to consider explicitly the surplus implications of diﬀerent formal rules,
therefore we no longer have a cost-minimization problem.
In general this is a fairly complex problem, but we can say something about the case in
which tasks diﬀer only by their disutility:
Proposition 5. Suppose tasks diﬀer only with respect to dk. Then, at the solution to (P’),
there exist three critical levels, d0 < d00 < d000, such that tasks with dk < d0 are regulated
by informal rule, tasks with d0 < dk < d00 are regulated by formal first-best rule, tasks with
d00 < dk < d000 are regulated by formal rigid rule, and tasks with dk > d000 are left to the agent’s
discretion.
This proposition highlights that the main consequence of large writing costs is that the
optimal contracting plan may include rigidity and/or discretion. The logic that drives this
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result is simple. Putting aside informal contracting for a moment, let us ask: which tasks
should be regulated by first-best rule, which by rigid rule, and which should be discretionary?
Note that, since the benefit πk is assumed constant across tasks, lower dk implies higher gross
surplus (σk = πk − dk). Intuitively, high-surplus tasks are regulated by a first best rule,
intermediate-surplus tasks are handled with a rigid rule, and low-surplus tasks are left to the
agent’s discretion. This part of the result is analogous to Proposition 1 in Battigalli and Maggi
(2002), and is a consequence of the fact that the writing cost is higher for a first-best rule than
for a rigid rule, and is zero for a discretionary task. Now consider also the possibility of informal
contracting. As we saw in the previous section, with small writing costs, lower disutility favors
informal contracting over formal contracting. This continues to be true with large writing costs,
hence the ranking described in Proposition 5 follows.
Another interesting point that is brought out in the presence of large writing costs is the
following. Formal and informal contracting not only tend to be used jointly, but are comple-
mentary in a stricter sense: when some tasks are discretionary, increasing the number of tasks
regulated formally (for example as a consequence of a reduction in writing costs) increases the
surplus from the relationship, thus relaxing the incentive constraint and making it easier to
regulate more tasks informally.37
We conclude with a note on the nature of writing costs in our model. We considered only
“variable” writing costs, that is costs that increase with the number of modifications to the
contract. One may also consider the impact of “quasi-fixed” writing costs, i.e. costs that are
incurred every time the contract is modified. Quasi-fixed writing costs would aﬀect the mode
of formal contracting in two ways: first, they would tilt the balance in favor of contingent
contracting as opposed to spot contracting, since the latter involves contract modifications over
time and the former does not; second, if spot contracting is nevertheless eﬃcient, there will be
a tendency to postpone some contract modifications so as to “cluster” several modifications in
a single period. This would complicate the analysis without adding much insight.
37A similar complementarity between formal and informal contracting is highlighted by Baker et al. (1994).
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6. Conclusion
In this paper we have implicitly assumed away an alternative mode of governance that could
avoid the costs of writing detailed contracts, namely giving authority to the principal. If the
principal could instruct the agent on what actions to take in each period, there would be no
need to specify contingencies or actions in a contract. In this concluding section we discuss how
results would change if we allowed for authority as a governance mode.
As a premise, it is useful to distinguish between formal and informal authority. We speak
of formal authority when the principal’s authority is specified in the formal contract, and the
agent can be punished by courts for disobeying the principal. We speak of informal authority
when the principal’s orders are not enforced by courts, but by credible punishment mechanisms.
Let us focus on formal authority first. It is critical to note that formal authority is enforce-
able only if two conditions are met: (i) the principal can send verifiable messages to the agent;
this requires that messages be written, or at least recorded; and (ii) messages must be expressed
in a language understood by the courts. In other words, messages must be formal. For this
reason, even if a system of formal messages is feasible, it is not clear that its costs would be
significantly lower than a system of formal contracts.38
Informal authority is a more common mode of governance in real organizations. In our
model, however, there is no role for such an arrangement, due to the assumption of symmet-
ric information. Given that the principal and the agent have the same information, informal
authority cannot improve on an informal contract as we defined it, because in the latter arrange-
ment the agent knows what actions to take under any contingency, hence there is no need for
further instructions from the principal. A role for informal authority would probably arise if
the principal had private information). An extension of the model in this direction is left for
future research.
38In their analysis of construction contracts, McLeod and Chakravorty (2004) consider an environment where
formal authority may be optimal. An essential feature that distinguishes their model from ours is that external
shocks are observed after the contract is signed.
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7. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) In the symmetric-persistence case the relevant thresholds for the parameter γ = c(e)c(a)
(defined in the proof of Proposition 1) collapse to the same value γ∗C/S = γ∗E/S = γ∗C/E =
rδ(1−p)
(1−δ) ,
which is decreasing in p. By Proposition 1, the number of tasks regulated by a spot rule way
is therefore decreasing as uncertainty increases (p decreases).
[Using the general expressions for γ∗C/S and γ∗E/S it is also easy to check that these thresholds
are decreasing in p keeping q fixed. This proves the claim made in footnote that the number of
tasks regulated by a spot rule is increasing if, for all tasks k, pk decreases with qk fixed, which
is another way to increase uncertainty.]
(ii) We verify that the threshold γ∗E/S is increasing in δ:
∂γ∗E/S
∂δ
= r(1− q) [1− δ(2p− 1)] {(1− δ) + δ(1− q)[1− δ(p+ q − 1)]}
(1− δ)2[1− δ(p+ q − 1)]2 > 0.
By Proposition 1, it follows that the number of tasks regulated by a spot rule is decreasing in
δ. ¥
Proof of Lemma 1
Let v(δ) be the minimum present value of net surpluses in the Markov perfect equilibrium
with respect to all possible states of the system, i.e.
v(δ) = min
g,M,s
v(g,M, s; δ),
where v(g,M, s; δ) is the present value of net surpluses when the set of clauses from the pre-
viuous period is g, the memory is M and the current state of nature is s, given discount
factor is δ. Function v(δ) is nondecreasing in δ, and (1 − δ)v(δ) it is bounded below byP
k:c(ak)<πk−dk [πk−dk−c(ak)], which is strictly positive because we assume that c(ak) < πk−dk
for at least some task k. This implies that δv(δ) converges monotonically to∞ as δ → 1. There-
fore there is exactly one value of δ in (0, 1) solving the following equation:
σ(N) =δv(δ). (7.1)
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Let δ∗ be the solution to (7.1). Then σ(N) ≤δv(δ) for each δ ≥ δ∗.
Since
σ(N) = δ∗v(δ∗) ≥ δ
∗
1− δ∗
"
σ(N)−
X
k∈N
c(ak)
#
,
it follows that δ∗ → 1
2
as c(ak)→ 0 for all k.
From now on we keep δ fixed and therefore we suppress in our notation the dependence
of values on δ. We exhibit a SPE keeping the principal at his maxmin under the parameter
restriction δ ≥ δ∗. Consider the following strategies: for all Markov states (g,M,s) the principal
makes amendments as in the MPE. Wages are determined according to a punishment phase.39
There are two punishment phases PP and PA. The system starts in phase PP . When the
system is in phase PP the (oﬀered) wage is the net profit generated by the oﬀered contract.
When the system is in phase PA the (oﬀered) wage is the disutility generated by the oﬀered
contract. As soon as player i deviates from his strategy the system switches immediately to
phase Pi. If the system is in phase PA the agent accepts the oﬀered contract (and chooses the
one-shot best response). Thus, in phase PA the MPE is played. If the system is in phase PP ,
the new set of default clauses and memory is (g0,M0), the oﬀered contract is (g0,m) and the
state of nature is s, then the agent accepts if and only if
m− d(g0, s) > δv(g0,M0|s), (7.2)
where δv(g0,M0|s) is the expected present value of the of the net surpluses generated by the
MPE starting from next period at (g0,M0) given the current shocks s, and d(g0, s) is the
disutility induced by the set of clauses g0 given s.
By construction, the agent has no incentive to deviate. In particular, suppose that the state
of nature is s, the principal moves the set of clauses and memory to (g0,M0) and oﬀers (g0,m)
so that, as a consequence, the system enters (or stays in) phase PP .
If m − d(g0, s) ≤ δv(g0,M0|s), the agent is supposed to reject. The expected payoﬀ if
the agent conforms is δv(g0,M0|s). The expected payoﬀ of a one-shot deviation is m− d(g0, s),
because after the deviation the system enters phase PA where the agent gets his maxmin (zero).
Therefore rejection is indeed a best response.
39Implicitly, we describe strategies as finite automata.
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If m − d(g0, s) > δv(g0,M0|s), the agent is supposed to accept and this is obviously a best
response.
We now check that the principal has no incentive to deviate in phase PP . The only way
for the principal to make a profitable one-shot deviation is to oﬀer a contract (g0,m) (by way
of appropriate amendments and exceptions) satisfying the acceptance condition (7.2). Observe
that by definition v(g0,M0|s) = Ps0 Pr[s0|s]v(g0,M0, s0) ≥ v. Therefore the net payoﬀ the
principal can get by “tempting” the agent is bounded above by
max
g0,M0
[σ(g0, s)− δv(g0,M0|s)] ≤ σ(N)− δv,
where σ(g0, s) is the surplus induced by g0 at state s. Recall that σ(N) − δv ≤ 0 because we
assumed δ ≥ δ∗. Therefore the principal has no profitable one-shot deviation. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2
It can be shown that under assumption (C) (small writing costs) at an eﬃcient task partition
all tasks are regulated by first best (formal or informal) rules. Furthermore, (C) implies (PC’).
Therefore the result follows as a corollary of Lemma 3, which is proved just below.¥
Proof of Lemma 3
We first prove that (IC’) and (PC’) are necessary for incentive compatibility. Suppose that
the tuple (I,C,E,S,R, (mt)t≥1) is part of a SPE. Then it must be the case that the present
value of the principal’s expected profits is always (weakly) positive and that the agent’s expected
utility from following (I,C,E,S,R, (mt)t≥1) is (weakly) larger than what the agent can get by
accepting the formal contract oﬀered by the principal, “shirking” on the tasks in I and rejecting
all future oﬀers. To write these incentive constraints in a relatively simple form, define
bmt+1(ht) := ∞X
k=1
δk−1E(mt+k|ht)
and let FB = I ∪C ∪ E ∪ S, FFB = C ∪E ∪ S denote, respectively, the set of tasks governed
by first best rules and the set of tasks governed by formal first best rules. Then for all t ≥ 0,
all ht+1 = (ht, st+1)
π(FB)
1− δ + bπt+1(R|ht, st+1)− bct+1(C,E,S|ht, st+1) ≥ mt+1(ht, st+1) + δ bmt+2(ht, st+1), (ICt+1P )
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and for all t ≥ 1, all ht = (ht−1, st)
mt(ht) + δ bmt+1(ht)− d(FB)
1− δ −
bdt(R|ht) ≥ mt(ht)− d(FFB)− d(R, st), (ICtA)
where bπt+1(R|ht+1) is the expected present value of gross benefits for tasks in R at date t+ 1
conditional on ht+1, bdt(R|ht) is the expected present value of disutilities from tasks in R at
date t conditional on ht, and d(R, st) is the disutility of the tasks regulated by rigid rules at st.
Incentive constraint (ICtA) can be written as
bmt+1(ht) ≥ 1
1− δ
∙
d(FFB) + d(I)
δ
¸
+ bdt+1(R|ht)
[note that bdt(R|ht)−d(R, st) = δ bdt+1(R|ht)]. Taking the expected value of both sides of (ICt+1P )
w.r.t. st+1 (conditional on ht) and combining with the above inequality we obtain
π(FB)
1− δ + bπt+1(R|ht)− bct+1(C,E,S|ht) ≥ bmt+1(ht) ≥ 11− δ
∙
d(FFB) + d(I)
δ
¸
+ bdt+1(R|ht),
which yields (IC’):
δ
1− δσ(FB) + δσˆt+1(R|ht)− δbct+1(C,E,S|ht) ≥ d(I).
The agent has no incentive to reject the proposed contract if for all t ≥ 1 and all ht
mt(ht) + δ bmt+1(ht) ≥ d(FB)
1− δ +
bdt(R|ht). (PCtA)
(PCtA) and (IC
t
P ) yield
π(FB)− d(FB)
1− δ + bπt(R|ht)− bdt(R|ht)− cˆt(C,E,S|ht) ≥ 0,
which is the aggregate participation constraint (PC’).
Now suppose that (I,C,E,S,R) satisfies (IC’) and (PC’). Consider a strategy profile based
on four phases, N1, N2, PA, PP . In the normal phases Nj each task covered by task partition
(I,C,E,S,R) (which need not be exhaustive) is regulated informally or by the corresponding
formal rule and the other tasks are left to the agent’s complete discretion. The system starts
in phase N1 and then from the following period moves to phase N2 if no deviation occurs. In
phase N1 (period 1) the transfer m1 is such that the participation constraints of principal and
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agent are satisfied (such m1 must exist because (PC’) holds). In phase N2 and period t (t ≥ 2)
the transfer is such that all the net surplus goes to the agent:
mt(ht) = σ(FB) + σ(R, st)− ct(E,S, ht).
In normal phases the agent accepts the proposed contract and chooses the eﬃcient action for
all the tasks k ∈ I. As soon as player i deviates the system switches immediately from the
current phase to the punishment phase Pi which is defined as in the proof of Lemma 1. Hence,
there are no incentives to deviate in the punishment phases.
The proof that the principal has no incentive to deviate in a normal phase is essentially the
same as in the proof of Lemma 1. By construction the agent has not incentive to reject the
contract in the first period. (PC’) implies that also in the following periods the agent has no
incentive to reject, because he is the recipient of the net surplus, which has positive present
value. To see that the agent has no incentive to cheat in a normal phase simply note that the
LHS of (IC’) is the expected present value of future net benefits to the agent (which he forgoes
if he cheats), whereas the RHS is the temptation to cheat, i.e. the disutility the agent avoids
by cheating on informal tasks. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3
Parts (i) and (iii) are obvious. To see that (ii) holds, first note that d(N) > δ
1−δσ(N) implies
that a fully informal contract violates (IC). Next suppose without loss of generality that dmin =
d1, and consider the task partition corresponding to the MPE modified by replacing the formal
rule for task 1 with the informal rule. The expected present value of writing costs conditional
on any history is bounded above by 1
1−δ
P
k>1 c(ak). If d1 ≤ δ1−δ [σ(N)−
P
k>1 c(ak)], then the
modified partition satisfies (IC), which means that a fully formal partition cannot be a solution
to problem (P). The latter inequality is satisfied if d1 < δ1−δσ(N) (that is σ(N) −
1−δ
δ d1 > 0)
and writing costs are suﬃciently small, i.e.
P
k>1 c(ak) ≤ σ(N)− 1−δδ d1. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that a (complete) task partition (I,C,E,S) satisfies (IC) and there are tasks j
and k such that j ∈ I, k ∈ C ∪ E ∪ S and dj > dk. Since by assumption, j and k have the
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same writing costs and transition probabilities, swapping the respective rules does not aﬀect
the present value of expected costs and relaxes the constraints (IC). Then (I,C,E,S) cannot
be the unique solution to (P). This shows that the (unique) solution to (P) must satisfy the
property that for some d all tasks k with dk < d are informal and all tasks k with dk ≥ d are
formal. ¥
Proof of Remark 1
Under the stated assumptions, Proposition 4 implies that for some threshold d all tasks k
with dk < d are governed by informal rule, and all tasks k with dk > d are governed by spot
rule. Assume without loss of generality that d1 ≤ d2 ≤ ...dN−1 ≤ dN . If it is optimal to use
the same type of rule for all formal tasks, then the solution to (P) can be found by solving the
following simpler problem:
max I
s.t.
IX
k=1
dk ≤
δ
1− δ [π(N)− d(N)]− (N − I)δcˆ
0
+1,
where I = |I| is the number of informal tasks and δcˆ0+1 is the present value future writing costs
for any given task k under the optimal formal rule in the most unfavourable situation, i.e. in
the Markov state where the PDV of future writing costs is the highest. If the formal rule is C,
then cˆ0+1 = 0; if it is E then cˆ0+1 = [r · c(a) + c(e)] δ(1−p)1−δp ; if it is S, then cˆ0+1 = r(1−q)[1−δ(2p−1)(1−δ)[1−δ(p+q−1]c(a)
(under a contingent rule all writing costs are paid upfront; under the enrichment rule future
writing costs are positive only if the initial rigid clause has not yet been amended to a contingent
clause; under the spot rule the PDV of future writing costs is higher when event ¬ek has just
occurred, because in this case the probability that future shocks will match the current rigid
clause is lower). It can be checked that the PDV of future net surpluses generated by a formal
task, δ
1−δ (πk − dk) − δcˆ
0
+1, is increasing in δ and (weakly) decreasing in p, q (parametrizing
uncertainty) and in writing costs. By inspection of the constraint, it is then clear that any of
the parameter changes under consideration (weakly) increases the optimal number of informal
tasks, and correspondingly (weakly) reduces the number of formal tasks. ¥
Proof of Remark 2
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Consider a model with two symmetric tasks and symmetric i.i.d. random processes: pk =
qk = 12 , c(ek) = c
e, c(ak) = ca = r · c(ak), πk = 1, dk = d < 1, k = 1, 2. The cost of a spot
rule is cˆ(S) = ca + δ
2(1−δ)c
a. We exhibit parameters values ce, ca, d, δ that satisfy the following
inequalities:
d > δ, (7.3)
δ
1− δ (2− 2d−
1
2
ca) < d ≤ δ
1− δ (2− 2d) (7.4)
ca + δ
2(1− δ)c
a < ca + ce < 2
∙
ca + δ
2(1− δ)c
a
¸
, (7.5)
2− 2d ≤ δ
1− δ (2− 2d)− 2δ(c
e + ca), (7.6)
ce + ca < 1− d (7.7)
Eq. (7.3) implies that fully informal contracting is not incentive compatible (see Proposition
4); (7.4) says that having one informal task and one task governed by spot rule violates (IC),
but having one informal task and one governed by contingent rule satisfies (IC); (7.5) says
that contingent contracting is more expensive than spot contracting, so that both tasks are
governed by a spot rule in the MPE, but one contingent rule is less costly than two spot rules;
(7.6) guarantees that it is possible to keep the principal at his maxmin in a subgame perfect
equilibrium; finally (7.7) is the small cost assumption. The last two conditions imply that a
solution to (P) is an eﬃcient task partition (see Lemma 2). If all these conditions are satisfied,
in the eﬃcient task partition one task is governed by contingent rule and the other is informal,
which proves the claim.
It can be verified that the following set of parameter values satisfies all the conditions:
ce = 1
9
, ca = 1
9
, d = 3
4
, δ = 5
8
. ¥
Proof of Remark 3
Consider again a model with two tasks where pk = qk = 12 , c(ek) = c
e, c(ak) = ca, r = 1,
πk = 1, k = 1, 2, d1 ≤ d2 < 1. The cost of a spot rule is cˆ(S) = ca + δ2(1−δ)ca. We exhibit
parameter values d1, d2, ce, ca, δ that satisfy the following inequalities:
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d1 + d2 > 2δ, (7.8)
δ
1− δ (2− d1 − d2) > d1 =
δ
1− δ [2− d1 − d2 −
1
2
ca], (7.9)
2
∙
ca + δ
2(1− δ)c
a
¸
> ca + ce > ca + δ
2(1− δ)c
a, (7.10)
2− d1 − d2 <
δ
1− δ (2− d1 − d2)− 2δ(c
e + ca) (7.11)
ca + ce < 1− d2 (7.12)
Condition (7.8) says that a fully informal task partition is not incentive compatible; (7.9)
says that governing task 1 by informal rule and task 2 by contingent rule satisfies (IC) as
a strict inequality, and that if the contingent rule is replaced by the spot rule (IC) is satis-
fied as an equality; (7.10 says that two spot rules cost more than one contingent rule, which
costs more than one spot rule; (7.11) implies that P can be punished at his maxmin; (??) is
the small cost assumption (S). By Lemma 2, if these conditions hold the eﬃcient partition is
(I,C,E,S) =({1}, ∅, ∅, {2}) (task 1 is informal, task 2 is governed by spot rule). After a suﬃ-
ciently small decrease of π(N) below 2, or δ, the strict inequalities still hold, but the equality in
(7.9) does not hold. Therefore the eﬃcient partition changes from (I,C,E,S) =({1}, ∅, ∅, {2})
(which now is not incentive compatible) to (I,C,E,S) =({1}, {2}, ∅, ∅) (task 2 goverend by
contingent rule). This proves the claim in reverse.
The following parameter values satisfy all the conditions: d1 = 34 , d2 =
31
40
, ce = 1
10
, ca = 1
20
,
δ = 5
8
. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose that tasks diﬀer only with respect to dk and a task partition (I,C,E,S,R) satisfying
(IC’) and (PC’) violates the property stated in the proposition. Note that πk − dk < πj − dj
if and only if dj < dk, because πk = πj. If dj < dk, but j /∈ FB and k ∈ FB, then it is
possible to increase the net surplus and relax constraints (IC’) and (PC’) by swapping the
rules for j and k (the present value of expected costs is not aﬀected because writing costs and
transition probabilities are the same for each task). Therefore the original partition cannot be
the solution to (P’). Similarly, if dj < dk, but j /∈ FB ∪R and and k ∈ FB ∪R, it is possible
40
to increase the net surplus and relax constraints (IC’) and (PC’) by swapping the rules for j
and k. Again, this means that the original partition cannot be the solution to (P’). This shows
that high surplus (low disutility) tasks are governed by first best rules, intermediate surplus
(intermediate disutility) tasks are governed by rigid rules, and low surplus (high disutility) tasks
are left to the agent’s discretion. Relying on the uniqueness of the solution to (P’) one can show
as in the proof of Proposition 4 that, among the first best tasks, those with lower disutility are
governed informally. ¥
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